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Latin America in the Post-national World 
The present situation of Latin America has to be explained in terms of 
the interaction between two main sets of factors. On the one hand 
there are the long-term cultural, political and economic processes 
which underlie its development since the early 16th century. On the 
other hand, there are the more conjunctional processes and results of 
events happening in the shorter term: namely, globalization, the preva-
lence of neoliberal policies since 1980 and the recent economic down-
turn which started in 2000 and which is just beginning to recede. In 
this paper I would like to consider both aspects. I shall start by briefly 
considering some characteristics of Latin America’s long-term road to 
modernity. 
 
1. Some features of the Latin American path to modernity 
For a start, four main cultural features, formed during three centuries 
of colonial rule, can be said to condition the character of the Latin 
American path to modernity. First, a catholic religious monopoly 
which was never seriously challenged by the main protestant denomi-
nations or by religious dissidence of popular origin. Second, political 
centralism which never had to compete with local (feudal) powers and 
third, a tendency to authoritarianism in politics which has survived 
even within formal democracy. Finally, an economic preference for 
exporting raw materials and primary products which fails to result in 
strong and independent industrial bourgeoisies and proletariats. All 
these elements point to a strong Latin American centralist cultural 
tradition (Véliz 1984: 15-16). 
The centralist and authoritarian features and the absence of a 
strong bourgeoisie give a special character both to the first experi-
ments with democracy and to the economic orientation in Latin Amer-
ica. The construction of democracy had initially an imitative charac-
ter: most constitutional projects very closely copied European or 
North American models. The majority of these projects were not suc-
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cessful and had an ephemeral character: they did not survive for a long 
time. In addition, they managed to achieve very reduced popular par-
ticipation. In so far as the economy is concerned, contrary to the 
European road to modernity, industrialization was postponed and re-
placed by a raw material exporting system which retained the back-
wardness of the productive sectors, especially under the hacienda sys-
tem. 
It was only during the first half of the 20th century, when due to 
the export crisis the oligarchic governments came to an end, that the 
state played a central role in two substantial advances of modernity. 
First, the expansion of democracy by the widening of the franchise 
which allowed the middle and working classes to participate in the 
political system from which they had been excluded so far. Second, 
the beginning of import-substituting industrialization, which promoted 
a new kind of inward-oriented economic development. 
However, the widening of democracy with the incorporation of the 
middle classes in political power and the implementation of social 
legislation, was not exempted from contradictions of an authoritarian 
character. During the three years that followed the Great Depression 
of 1929, seventeen governments were overthrown by force in twelve 
Latin American countries (Véliz 1984: 273). In several cases, it was 
military interventions that gave rise to populist and nationalist regimes 
which widened political participation and established forms of welfare 
state and social legislation from above and against the conservative 
forces entrenched in parliaments. These regimes sought the support of 
the masses by organizing them. Peron in Argentina and Vargas in 
Brazil helped create trade unions from within the state. 
Thus between 1930 and 1970 a process of modernization was con-
solidated in Latin America which widened democracy and the process 
of industrialization began to make progress. The latter was realized 
with heavy state protection and investment, which continued practi-
cally until the end of the 1970s. At the same time, the populist coali-
tions that carried out these reforms also established incipient forms of 
social legislation and welfare state. Therefore, it could be argued that 
the general orientation of the modernizing process in Latin America at 
this time had more affinity with the European road to modernity than 
with the North American one.  
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In spite of this clear-cut influence of European modernity, there 
are important differences that remain between the European path and 
the Latin American one. Conditioned by cultural traits formed during 
three centuries of colonial rule, Latin American modernity tends to 
have a centralized character while European modernity is inclined to 
have more decentralized features. This affects both democracy and the 
economy. The European parliamentary system generally distributes 
power more evenly, while the Latin American presidential system 
tends to concentrate power. In Latin America “presidentialism” is an 
important source of serious conflicts between the executive and legis-
lative powers; such conflicts are not necessarily as acute in the Euro-
pean parliamentary regimes. This factor has contributed in an impor-
tant manner to the political instability of Latin America because the 
executive as much as the legislative branches of the state claim popu-
lar legitimacy and tend to blame each other for their problems (Hart-
lyn/Valenzuela 1997: 23). An example of this is the recent parliamen-
tary attempt to impeach President Lucio Gutiérrez of Ecuador. 
On the economic front, the British industrial bourgeoisie was born 
far away from the state centres of power in small provincial work-
shops, whereas the Latin American industrial bourgeoisie was created 
by state action and has always been much more dependent on state aid 
in order to exist and prosper. The key role of the state in the birth of 
entrepreneurial classes has led them to interfere much more actively in 
politics in order to achieve favourable conditions in their own inter-
ests, which is also destabilizing and potentially increases the possibili-
ties of corruption. 
A second important difference between the European trajectory 
and the Latin American one has to do with the practical efficacy of 
citizens’ rights. While in Europe there is a greater correspondence 
between citizens’ rights and their respect in practice, in Latin America 
declared rights enacted in constitutions and laws often lack guarantees 
and accessible procedures that protect them in practice. According to 
Whitehead “the majority of subjects experience the insecure and un-
predictable character of their rights” (Whitehead 1997: 69) and often 
are defenceless in the face of the enormous power of the state and 
enterprises. This is related to what O’Donnell has called “a democracy 
of low intensity citizenship” which occurs when the state is unable to 
enforce its legality, not so much in the area of political rights, as in the 
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area of civil rights: “peasants, slum-dwellers, Indians, women, et al., 
are often unable to get fair treatment in the courts, or to obtain from 
state agencies services to which they are entitled, or to be safe from 
police violence … etc.” (O’Donnell 1993: 16).  
The difference between Europe and Latin America can be under-
stood further by means of a distinction between the polycentric struc-
ture of European modernity and the concentric structure of the Latin 
American modernity (Mascareño 2000; Leiva 2003). A polycentric 
society would be that in which its diverse component systems such as 
politics, law, economy, religion, science and art are highly autono-
mous and able to organize themselves without interference from oth-
ers, thus excluding the possibility that one of them controls the others 
and becomes the centre of society. On the contrary, in Latin American 
concentric society, although there is functional differentiation, the 
political system instrumentalizes the other systems by imposing upon 
them its own logic and interests (Mascareño 2004: 68-69 and foot-
note 15). The autonomy of politics is realized at the cost of the other 
spheres’ own autonomy.  
This is the reason why Brunner has argued that in contrast to the 
modernity of central countries, Latin American modernity suffers 
from a  
voracity of politics which swallows everything and behind which every-
one seeks protection or justification: equally entrepreneurs, intellectuals, 
universities, trade unions, social organisations, clerics, the armed forces 
(Brunner 1988: 33).  
The enormous gravitation of politics and the state also reaches art, 
culture and education. The consequence of this tendency, widely rec-
ognized by many authors, is that, in general, civil society in Latin 
America (the sphere of individuals, classes and non-governmental 
organizations) is weak, insufficiently developed and very dependent 
upon the state.  
By 1973 a new phase set in which end the stage of protected and 
centralized modernization. At this time in Latin America the processes 
of industrialisation and development entirely lost their dynamism, 
economic growth came to a standstill and even became negative dur-
ing the 80s, and as a consequence social and labour agitation became 
widespread. The international recession resulted in unemployment, 
inflation and increased political instability everywhere. Under the 
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threat of increasingly radicalized left-wing urban movements, a new 
wave of military coups set in all over Latin America. This time round 
right-wing dictatorships are established, not only more durable than 
those of the 1930s in Brazil, Argentina, Uruguay, Paraguay, Chile, 
Bolivia, Ecuador, etc., but also with longer-term social and economic 
impacts associated with the application of new economic policies of 
liberal character.  
 
2. The Impact of the new Neoliberal Stage 
The novelty of the situation, which came to confirm old cultural 
trends, is that the renewed liberal character of economic policies can 
coexist with authoritarianism in politics. This has three important ef-
fects on the modernizing processes: on the one side the reaffirmation 
of the authoritarian centralist tendency in conflict with the rule of law. 
Second, the relative depoliticization of society and, third, the begin-
ning of a change from the relative influence of the European social 
democratic model of welfare state to the preeminence of the North 
American model of individual liberty.  
In the first place, the authoritarian centralist tendency was con-
firmed by the new wave of dictatorships. This is just the last instal-
ment in a long history in which the breakdowns of democracy and the 
recurrent presence of dictatorships figure prominently. True, from the 
first years of widespread anarchy (1810-1850) to the 20th century, 
there has been much improvement. Yet one would be mistaken in 
believing that the 20th century represents a dramatic shift from the old 
pattern. During this time there were 3 periods in which many Latin 
American governments were overthrown by force: 1930-1933, 1948-
1954 and 1964-1980.  
Some authors have contrasted European stability, where there is a 
closer correspondence and articulation between the political system 
and the legal system (Mascareño 2004: 65), with the Latin American 
instability, where power and legality are frequently decoupled. In the 
first case there is a form of articulation between the two systems 
which mutually respect the autonomy of each other in their own 
sphere. This means that “the function of politics – to take binding 
collective decisions – is not … directly realized through power, but 
processed by means of legality and only then transformed into law” 
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(Mascareño 2004: 73). It also means that political power provides 
external support so that legality could be enforced within other sys-
tems, beyond the legal system itself (Mascareño 2004: 65). 
That this does not always happen in Latin America can be ex-
plained by the concentric structure of its modernity, whereby politics 
has acquired primacy over other spheres and often does without legal-
ity, or, more frequently, accommodates legality to its own interests 
and prevents it from fulfilling its role in other spheres. Given the char-
acter of Latin American culture, the de facto surpassing of legality is 
almost always accompanied by a strong nominal legalism which seeks 
juridical justifications. But all the same, the coupling of power and 
legality has been always weaker in Latin America, given the cultural 
centrality of power and authority. The European polycentric structure, 
on the contrary, seems to guarantee that politics, even though also 
playing a central role, respects the autonomy of legality and avoids 
flouting it. 
The second effect of the changes occurring since 1970 in Latin 
America is the relative depoliticization of society (at least in the tradi-
tional sense of institutionalized democratic politics). There has been a 
change from a positive evaluation of politicians, parties and ideologies 
as essential elements for leading a nation in the years prior to the 
1970s, to the present extremely negative evaluation and generalized 
disillusion with them. The depoliticization of Chileans, for example, 
can be detected throughout the 1990s by most surveys, which consis-
tently show a decrease in the identification of people with political 
parties, a growing lack of interest in political affairs and a negative 
evaluation of politicians. The loss of prestige of politicians and the 
disaffection with politics in general has also become acute in Vene-
zuela, Bolivia, Peru, Ecuador and Argentina. 
The origins of this are clearly related to two factors. First, the fail-
ure of politics to deliver the kind of economic development which 
could redistribute wealth and thus bringing down widespread poverty. 
Second, the political repression taking place during military dictator-
ships. Military dictatorships sought to depoliticize society by eliminat-
ing elections, abolishing political parties and closing down parlia-
ments. However, after a few years of forced depoliticization by terror, 
the very policies of exclusion and violation of human rights, led to the 
opposite result in the long-term: society became more intensely politi-
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cized against military governments. This led to a search for crucial 
agreements and strong coalitions among the opposition forces in order 
to negotiate the end of military rule, thus allowing the return to de-
mocracy. Paradoxically, it was the negotiated conditions for the transi-
tion to democracy that had to do with depoliticization (Silva 2004: 
159-160). This in three different ways. 
First, democratic coalition forces exercised a strong restraining in-
fluence on popular mobilization so as not to give the military a motive 
to return. In almost every country of the region trade unions were par-
tially dismantled and those which survived experienced a severe loss 
of influence and power. Politicians of the centre-left frequently re-
sorted to self-censorship and did not want to support any movement 
which could cause political upheaval among the armed forces or en-
trepreneurial sectors.  
Second, part of the negotiated deals to return to democracy in-
cluded, even if sometimes only implicitly, total respect for the self-
regulating nature of the economic sphere in order to protect it from the 
ups and downs of everyday political discussion. The price of democra-
tization was the increased autonomy of and the loss of state control 
over the economy. Politics became more self-referential and people 
lost interest in it.  
A part of this process was the new attitude of social scientists, 
many of them persecuted and exiled. The years of bloody dictator-
ships in Brazil, Chile, Argentina, Uruguay, Paraguay and Bolivia, not 
to speak of the more or less permanent situation of repression in Cen-
tral America, changed their perception of politics. Their focus of 
analysis radically shifted, from strategies for social change and devel-
opment to problems of the political system, democracy and human 
rights. Important as these problems are, the exclusive re-focussing on 
them by default left the management of the economy to the new neo-
liberal forces (Lechner 1991). This abdication of responsibility also 
had depoliticising effects. 
Third, when democracy returned, the newly elected governments 
did not satisfy people’s expectations that those responsible for the 
human rights abuses would be brought to justice. Which again pro-
duced deep disillusionment and political demobilization. Human 
rights groups experienced great difficulties in getting support from 
politicians. Democratic governments accepted or even enacted am-
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nesty laws which exempted the military from any responsibility. In 
Chile, for instance, many deputies from the governing coalition (Con-
certacion) voted against the political condemnation of Pinochet when 
he took his seat in Senate. The Concertacion’s strategy to cause a 
minimum of problems with the armed forces prompted a marked pol-
icy to lower the profile of complaints by the surviving victims and 
families of the disappeared victims. It was only from the moment  
Pinochet was detained in London, ten years after the return to democ-
racy, that Chilean tribunals started processing some criminal lawsuits 
which involved members of the armed forces and changed the inter-
pretation of the amnesty law which exempted them from responsibil-
ity. 
The newly acquired autonomy of the economic system in Latin 
America since the arrival of neoliberalism and its market-oriented 
economic policies, has nevertheless not meant that the economic sys-
tem has replaced politics in the concentric pattern referred to above. 
The economic system continues to be frequently threatened not only 
by globalization, but also by political interventions, sometimes of a 
very arbitrary nature. It is true that the State is now weaker in terms of 
its capacity to implement progressive and redistributive social poli-
cies, but the executive power is stronger in terms of being able to take 
more or less arbitrary decisions (Boschi 2004: 290). Politics, through 
its privileged means, power, continues to be the central element which 
has been unable to fully subject itself to legality in Latin America, or 
rather it accommodates legality to its own interests. Thus President 
Meza of Bolivia or President Kirchner of Argentina or President 
Chavez of Venezuela frequently take decisions which interfere with 
the market and sometimes with international agreements. It cannot be 
maintained that the new autonomy of the economic system has dis-
placed the preponderance of the presidential political system. 
The third effect of changes occurring since 1970 in Latin America 
is the transition, very marked in some countries like Mexico, Argen-
tina, Peru, Colombia and Chile, from a more interventionist social 
democratic European model of capitalism to a North American model 
of individual autonomy and diminished state intervention. It cannot be 
said that the welfare state existed everywhere in Latin America or that 
it was remotely as complete as the European model. Yet it had a rela-
tively important influence. At any rate, the little welfare state that 
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could be found tended to be dismantled with the arrival of neoliberal-
ism and the new model of individual citizenship drawn from the North 
American model. This has resulted in the privatization (and sometimes 
deterioration) of public education, health and social security and the 
sale of state public services and facilities. It has also meant the end of 
a series of interventionist economic policies, such as subsidies, price 
fixing, import and export controls, financial regulations of capital 
movements, differentiated and high custom tariffs, high state expendi-
ture, etc. Within the new North American model trade unions and 
social organizations are weakened and, generally, a new kind of citi-
zenship is brought about whereby citizens are basically conceived of 
as individual consumers of goods and services in the market.  
Although up to a point the European social democratic regimes 
have also suffered the impact of the new neoliberal ideas and, under 
the pressure of having to curb excessive state expenditure, have been 
forced to cut their funding of the welfare state, public health and edu-
cation, it is also true that even during the most radical right-wing gov-
ernments of Mrs. Thatcher in Britain or Mr. Kohl in Germany the 
welfare state was not really dismantled to the extent it has been (the 
little that there was) in Latin America. Besides, economic policies in 
Europe have been coordinated, made uniform and regulated by the 
European Union for all the member states, which up to a point means 
a bigger degree of intervention in the economy. In Latin America, on 
the contrary, the tendency has been to deregulate, sell state assets, 
open frontiers and markets and enter into free trade agreements.  
 
3. The Articulation between Politics and Economic Neoliberalism 
From the mid-1980s onwards, a massive return to democracy has 
taken place in Latin America. What is important and different from 
other occasions is the renewed resilience of democracy which has 
allowed it to survive until now in most countries. Yet despite this 
newly acquired strength of democracy in the region, the picture of 
political instability has been growing worse since 2000 in Peru, Bo-
livia, Argentina, Venezuela, Colombia, Ecuador, etc. The failed coup 
attempt against Chavez in Venezuela, the quick change of resigning 
presidents in Argentina (5 presidents in 2 weeks), the resignation of 
Fujimori in Peru and Sanchez de Losada in Bolivia, the very precari-
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ous situation of Toledo in Peru, Gutiérrez in Ecuador and Meza in 
Bolivia, are symptoms of political systems in which legality continues 
to be frequently overstepped. In spite of this continuing political in-
stability, dictatorships have not come back and this may have to do 
with the almost total disappearance of the revolutionary left and the 
discouragement of the United States (Silva 2004: 168).  
The return to democracy was on the whole very rapid, Chile being 
the last country to come back to it in 1989. But it did not mean a 
change from the neoliberal economic policies started by the dictator-
ships. As Yocelevzky has put it, a factor shared by Latin American 
processes of democratization has been “the discrepancy between the 
democratic character of political change and the non-egalitarian, con-
centrating and excluding character of the development model upon 
whose base those changes occurred” (Yocelevzky 2002: 44).  
In many ways, therefore, it can be seen that one of the main differ-
ences of Latin American modernity compared with European moder-
nity is the type of articulation between politics and the economy. 
Whereas in Europe there seems to be a greater consistency between a 
socially oriented democracy and an economy quite regulated by the 
state or the European Union, in Latin America there is a co-existence 
between centralist and authoritarian features in politics with liberalism 
in economics. Sometimes this is seen as a contradiction or inconsis-
tency on the part of the Latin American ruling classes. What this criti-
cism overlooks is that neoliberalism in itself, at least in Hayek’s ver-
sion of it, which seems to be prevalent in Latin America, inherently 
entails this duality of authoritarian conservatism in cultural and politi-
cal matters and liberalism in economic matters. 
What Hayek proposes is a conservative kind of liberalism which 
highlights three elements: first, an inherent respect for tradition which 
fits into an evolutionist conception of culture. Second, a distrust of all 
attempts at constructing a social order by means of planning which is 
a consequence of the inherent limitations of reason. Third, a separa-
tion of liberalism from democracy. According to Hayek, democratiza-
tion demands an absolute power of the majority and in that way it 
could become a sort of anti-liberalism. This opposition between de-
mocracy and liberalism is at the heart of neoliberalism and has fre-
quently allowed the ideological justification of dictatorships in Latin 
America. According to Hayek it is possible to have totalitarian democ-
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ratic governments and authoritarian liberal governments and the latter 
are certainly preferable to the former. Why is it that this kind of 
thought could become so widespread in Latin America? 
My hypothesis is that this is related to the prevalence of Catholi-
cism in Latin America. In contrast to the European and North Ameri-
can paths to modernity, which were influenced by a protestant ethic 
that values democracy and legality and that, on the other hand, pro-
motes the scientific and rational control of nature, the Latin American 
path to modernity has been influenced by Catholicism and by authori-
tarian and centralist forms of government and has had a less marked 
orientation to the rational control of nature and to technology. The 
enormous cultural weight of Catholicism in Latin America has been 
no doubt related to the great success and acceptance of Hayek’s brand 
of neoliberalism in the region.  
In spite of the democratizing influence of Enlightenment thought 
after Latin American independence, which no doubt resulted in a par-
tial moderation of authoritarianism, the latter’s cultural strength has 
not been entirely extinguished in Latin America’s socio-political life, 
as we have just seen. Weber’s classical thesis linked Calvinism and 
protestant Puritanism with the rationalistic spirit of capitalism. Tradi-
tional Catholicism appears to have a greater affinity with Hayek’s type 
of neoliberalism. In his conception religion, authoritarianism and a 
free market system become fused. This could help explain the greater 
ease with which an overwhelmingly catholic Latin America has 
adopted a more radical sort of neoliberalism,1 while in protestant 
countries a stronger bond survives between protestantism, democracy 
and rational constructivism.  
It is also important to see the connection between a prevalent neo-
liberal outlook and the new weakness of the industrialization process 
in Latin America. State-protected and state-promoted industrialization 
had been the Latin American approach during the first half of the 20th 
century. The present neoliberal policies of openness to the interna-
tional market and avoidance of subsidies and state protection have 
                                                     
1  The affinity between Catholicism and Hayekian neoliberalism should not make 
one forget that the same Catholicism is able to engender quite enlightened forms 
of opposition to neoliberalism and capitalism as those to be found in Liberation 
Theology. Yet it is also true to say that they do not prevail within the catholic 
church and have tended to be repressed by the hierarchy. 
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meant in practice not only the abandonment of industrialization but 
also an actual process of deindustrialization in many Latin American 
countries. Even more, many orthodox economists in the region pro-
pound the idea that industrialization is not in itself the only road to 
development and that by following the theory of comparative advan-
tages some countries can hope to fully develop with almost no indus-
trialization. With the exception of Brazil and Mexico this could be the 
case of the majority of Latin American countries which basically con-
tinue to export primary products.  
In effect, free trade and economic policies open to the world mar-
ket have brought about a considerable diminution of industrial produc-
tion and employment in Latin America. Some big countries like Mexi-
co and Brazil managed to expand their industrial exports after a while. 
The rest, on the contrary, followed a more radical model of laissez-
faire which diversified the export of primary products, but also made 
more permanent the low level of industrial production and employ-
ment. In this, the Latin American path to modernity has been very 
different from the Asiatic one, where the state took an important role 
in the acquisition and adaptation of state-of-the-art technologies and in 
the promotion of industrial exports (Gwynne 1996: 228-229; 220).  
 
4. Results of the Globalized Neoliberal Stage: an Appraisal 
In assessing the results of the neoliberal stage and globalization in 
Latin America, it is clear that in spite of some macro-economic gains 
like the control of inflation, the influx of foreign capital and fiscal 
stability, the social impact of radical neoliberal policies plus the re-
sults of the economic crisis taking place since 2000, have been on the 
whole very negative: there has been a steady rise of unemployment 
and a loss of stability of many jobs. In countries like Peru, Bolivia, 
Paraguay and Ecuador, the so-called “informal sector” – with its low-
wage no-benefits jobs – is greater than the “formal” one, and in the 
rest of Latin America, with the exception of Chile, the informal sector 
employs more than the 40% of the workforce (Gwynne 2004: 55). 
There has also been downward pressures on real wages, reduction in 
the minimum wage, increased inequalities in the distribution of wealth 
and a substantial increase in poverty.  
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Countries like Bolivia, Peru, Ecuador, Colombia and Venezuela, 
the so-called Andean countries, have today a lower per capita income 
than in 1990. In the majority of Latin American countries, more than 
25% of the population live under the poverty level. In at least seven 
countries of the region more than half of the population live in that 
condition, even if poverty has somewhat receded in many of them. On 
the whole, in Latin America 225 million people (43,9%) have incomes 
below the poverty level (PNUD 2004: 36). 
It is no surprise then that the divergence between the Latin Ameri-
can region and the developed world should continue to grow. In 1978, 
the per capita income of the six core economies was five times that of 
the six richer Latin American countries and twelve times that of the 
six poorer ones. By 2001, the ratio had increased to seven and 29 re-
spectively. But asymmetries have also become internal to Latin Amer-
ica. The gap between the six richer countries and the six poorer ones 
has almost doubled between 1978 and 2001 (Gwynne 2004: 8-9). 
Most of the direct foreign investment, virtually 75%, has gone to 
Mexico, Brazil and some Caribbean offshore financial centres. Brazil 
and Mexico are practically the only countries in Latin America that 
have acquired some industrial technological capacity and which can 
therefore export manufactured products, while the rest of Latin 
American countries export mainly primary products. 
The negative results have brought about strong resistance to the 
model practically everywhere and as a result serious problems of gov-
ernance have arisen in the region. In Argentina, Peru, Bolivia, Uru-
guay, Venezuela and Ecuador there has been growing opposition to 
neoliberal policies. The governance problems are also related to a 
crisis of the party system. Traditional parties are no longer able to 
represent the needs and hopes of the voters, and hence they have all 
but lost support. In the recent municipal elections in Bolivia (5th De-
cember 2004) traditional parties like the Movement of the Revolution-
ary Left (MIR), the Movement of the National Revolution (MNR), 
New Republican Force (NFR) and National Democratic Action 
(ADN) were almost completely wiped out and the new Movement 
Towards Socialism (MAS), originating amongst the “cocaleros” (coca 
cultivators), became the biggest party. In Uruguay, the elections at the 
end of 2004 brought about the collapse of the traditional parties (Colo-
rado party and Blanco party) which had alternated in ruling the coun-
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try for more than 170 years. A coalition of moderate left-wing forces 
achieved an absolute majority in parliament and also elected the presi-
dent of the country (Tabaré Vásquez). 
There has also been a tendency to endless fragmentation of politi-
cal parties and lack of loyalty to them. In many countries social move-
ments have become far more important than parties. In the last Co-
lombian election there were around 70 political parties. In Ecuador the 
practice of winning an election while representing a party, only to 
change it once elected, is widespread (Arriagada 2004: 4). Over all of 
Latin America the support of people for parliaments and political par-
ties has fallen below 25% (PNUD 2004: 12). Exceptionally, Chile 
maintains a solid and representative party structure, but almost 3 mil-
lion young people refuse to register to be able to vote. Inevitably, all 
this has affected the functioning of democracy. 
Economic issues related to the daily lives of the people have be-
come paramount in Latin America, so much so that for most people 
their economic well-being has become more important than democ-
racy itself. The politicians and parties’ loss of prestige has necessarily 
affected adhesion to democracy, particularly among the young. The 
survey conducted by the PNUD shows that a majority of Latin Ameri-
cans are prepared to drop democracy if it does not solve their eco-
nomic problems. In fact, 54.7% of all Latin Americans reply that they 
would be prepared to accept an authoritarian government if it was 
capable of solving the economic situation (PNUD 2004: 27, 31). Even 
if since 1989 Latin American countries have not fallen again into dic-
tatorships, the widespread poverty and inequality has made democracy 
less appealing. 
Widespread poverty and disaffection with democracy and politics 
seem to be the two common elements which affect most Latin Ameri-
can countries in the 2000s. Together they contribute to an increasing 
problem of governance or, at least, to an increasing gap between peo-
ple’s expectations and the ability of democratic institutions to deliver. 
This is why the credibility and the very stability of democratic institu-
tions is at risk. And yet, it is difficult to generalize about the likely 
consequences. For a start, on the economic front there is hardly a new 
model emerging which could present itself as an alternative to the 
prevalent neoliberal policies. So the opposition to them is disinte-
grated and not strong enough to threaten their viability. On the politi-
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cal front, in spite of the increasing problems of governance and depo-
liticization, democracy has survived but also with different levels of 
risk.  
Three different situations seem to be emerging. A first group of 
countries including Venezuela, Bolivia, Argentina and Uruguay since 
the election of Tabaré Vásquez, have been hit so hard by an economic 
and political crisis that their political stability has been threatened and 
both their governments and peoples are increasingly disaffected with 
globalization and the leadership of the United States. A second group 
including Peru, Ecuador and Colombia, also in deep crisis, suffer from 
an important split between the people, which are mostly disaffected 
and disillusioned, and the governments, which still want to pursue 
American-led globalization as a way out. Finally there is Chile and 
Mexico, which in spite of having some problems, have still managed 
to grow and have fully embraced American-sponsored globalization. 
Popular resistance to globalization in them is far less marked.  
Where can Brazil be placed? Well it is difficult to say. Brazil is 
clearly more stable politically and follows more orthodox economic 
policies than the countries in the first group. Brazilian people are not 
as disaffected with the government as Peruvians or Ecuadoreans in the 
second group, nor is the government fully neoliberal when the coun-
try’s industrial interests are at stake. On the other hand it is far less 
keen on United States-led globalization than Chile and Mexico. More-
over its sheer size and huge population make it qualitatively different. 
Maybe then, Brazil is in a league of its own, or in a bigger league, as 
many of its politicians increasingly believe. Notwithstanding that, 
there is little doubt that it shares many common cultural features and 
most important problems with the rest of Latin America – even if in a 
distinct way – and because of that, its future is tied up with the future 
of Latin America.  
The variety of situations in Latin America poses a challenge to the 
role which the region can play in the world. If, as the title given by me 
to this paper suggests, the world is entering a post-national phase, then 
there is little future for Latin America as a balkanized conjunction of 
nations. The example of the European Union is in this sense crucial to 
Latin America. And perhaps Brazil’s unique position in the region is 
strategic to playing a leading role in trying to achieve the elusive goal 
of a Latin American Union. 
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